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Abstract:  This talk is about the broadly Kantian idea that sensible experience, though in some sense passive, should in principle be no less the expression of the self-determination that is proper to a rational mind than any activity that is more naturally associated with cognitive autonomy, like overt efforts of deliberation and inquiry, or even submitting the conceptual resources of a way of life or intellectual tradition to criticism.  This broadly Kantian conception of experience figures prominently in the work of John McDowell, who is curiously indifferent to the role of attention in perceptual experience.  I suggest that attention is a fundamental engagement of our cognitive agency, and that experience requires attention.  I conclude that we need to accept both points in order to entitle ourselves to the Kantian conception of experience at issue. 

Free and open to all.

The Sapientia Lecture Series is funded by The Mark J. Byrne 1985 Fund in Philosophy.