David Plunkett
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Personal Website
Selected Publications
“Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry”, Ethics. (2017). Vol. 128, No. 1, 37-68. Co-authored with Scott Shapiro.
“Reasons Internalism", The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. (2017). Eds. McPherson and Plunkett. Routledge. 324-339. Co-authored with Errol Lord.
“The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics”, The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. (2017). Eds. McPherson and Plunkett. Routledge. 1-28. Co-authored with Tristram McPherson.
“Negotiating the Meaning of “Law”: The Metalinguistic Dimension of the Dispute Over Legal Positivism”, Legal Theory. (2016). Vol. 22, No. 3-4, 205-275.
“Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy”, Jurisprudence. (2016). Vol. 7, No. 1, 1-29.
“Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of Inquiry: , A Framework for Thinking about the Relevance of the History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry”, Ergo. (2016). Vol. 3, No. 2, 27-64.
“Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy”, Inquiry. (2015). Vol. 58, Nos. 7-8, 828-874.
“Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 10. (2015). Ed. Shafer-Landau. Oxford. 104-133. Co-authored with Tristram McPherson.
“Non-Consequentialism Demystified”, Philosophers’ Imprint. (2015). Volume 15, 1-28. Co-authored with Howard Nye and John Ku.
“Antipositivist Arguments from Legal Thought and Talk: The Metalinguistic Response”, Pragmatism, Law, and Language. Ed. G. Hubbs and D. Lind. Routledge. 56-75. (2014). Co-authored with Tim Sundell.
“Dworkin’s Interpretivism and The Pragmatics of Legal Disputes”, Legal Theory. Volume 19, 242-281. (2013). Co-authored with Tim Sundell.
“Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms”, Philosophers’ Imprint. Volume 13, 1-37. (2013). Co-authored with Tim Sundell.
“Conceptual Ethics” (I and II), Philosophy Compass. Volume 8, 1091-1011 and 1102-1110. (2013). Co-authored with Alexis Burgess.
“Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Volume 33, 563-605. (2013).
“The Planning Theory of Law” (I and II), Philosophy Compass. Volume 8, 149–158 and 159-169. (2013).
“A Positivist Route for Explaining How Facts Make Law”, Legal Theory. Volume 18, 139-207. (2012).
“Expressivism, Representation, and the Nature of Conceptual Analysis”, Philosophical Studies. Volume 156, 15-31. (2011).